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Abstract
In this paper, a Grossman-Helpman-Romer-type endogenous growth
model is developed with two regions in which there are mobile workers
and linkage between consumption goods and differentiated interme-
diate goods. The economy has the potential to reach the following
spatial configuration: full agglomeration, partial agglomeration, and
segmented agglomeration. In perfect agglomeration, the innovation
sector and intermediate goods sector agglomerate in one region. In
partial agglomeration, intermediate goods firms partially agglomerate
in the region where the innovation sector agglomerates perfectly. In
segmented agglomeration, the innovation sector agglomerates in the
region where both intermediate goods sector and final good sector do
not agglomerate perfectly.
In addition, we show the comparison of the welfare of skilled work-
ers in each steady state. Not surprisingly, the welfare of the skilled
in full agglomeration is always the highest. However, even though
there are transportation costs of final good, the welfare in segmented
agglomeration is not necessarily the lowest.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, a Grossman-Helpman-Romer-type endogenous growth model
is developed with two regions, in which there are two types of workers (i.e.,
skilled and unskilled) and a linkage between the production of consumption
good and that of differentiated intermediate inputs. The activity of the in-
novation sector results in the expansion of the differentiated goods. In this
paper, the term growth means the expansion of differentiated goods. The
innovation sector uses only skilled workers. We assume that the productivity
of each skilled worker residing in a certain region is affected by the knowledge
capital, which is determined by an interaction among the skilled. Knowledge
capital in one region increases as the number of skilled workers residing in
this region increases. The productivity of the skilled increases as knowledge
capital increases. Thus, the productivity of skilled workers increases as their
number increases. Due to this assumption, skilled workers tend to agglom-
erate in one region. In this setting, we investigate spatial configurations and
the welfare of skilled workers.
Agglomeration of innovation activity is notable in economic activity. Fur-
thermore, agglomeration of the innovation sector does not always occur in
the region where manufacturing sectors agglomerate. The statistics pre-
sented by the Japan Statistics Bureau show that the share of the number
of workers who work at academic research institutions in three metropolitan
areas (i.e., Tokyo and Kanagawa Prefectures, Aichi Prefecture, and Osaka
and Hyogo Prefectures) is about 37%. In addition, the data presented at
the Japan Patent Office shows that the share of patent registrations in the
three metropolitan areas is more than 80%. Moreover, an examination of
the research and development sector of the Japanese motor industry shows
that the innovation sectors of the automobile industry are located in Kanto
or Tokai area.
Turning to the United States, Audretsh and Feldman (1996) report that
the distribution of innovation is not uniform and that the cause of the ag-
glomeration of innovation is not merely the agglomeration of production.
The industry where knowledge spillovers are more widespread has a stronger
propensity for agglomeration in one region. However, the region in which ag-
glomeration of the innovation activity occurs might not be necessary where
manufacturing activity is occurring. This is shown by comparing Audretsh
and Feldman (1996) with Hanson (1998). Both papers discuss the distri-
bution of innovation activity in the United States. Audretsh and Feldman
(1996) indicate that the agglomeration of the innovation sector in New Eng-
land is notable. On the other hand, Hanson (1998) shows that the share
of the manufacturing sector of New England is low. In short, this implies
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that the places where innovation occurs may be different from those where
production takes place.
From a theoretical viewpoint, in terms of the migration of skilled work-
ers and the production of patents, our model is close to that of Fujita and
Thisse (2003). Moreover, in terms of the supply side, our model is close
to that of Yamamoto (2003). In Fujita and Thisse (2003), the linkage be-
tween manufacturing firms and workers and knowledge spillovers lead to the
agglomeration of firms and workers. On the other hand, we show that the
linkage between final good firms and intermediate goods firms leads to ag-
glomeration of firms in both sectors. In Yamamoto (2003), the transaction
between intermediate goods sector and manufactured goods sector creates a
linkage. In addition, there is a linkage between the innovation sector and
manufactured goods sector due to the assumption that the innovation sector
uses manufactured goods as inputs. However, there is no linkage between
the innovation sector and manufactured goods sector in our model. Fur-
thermore, there is a difference between Yamamoto (2003) and our model in
terms of mobility. Although, in Yamamoto (2003), workers are identical and
immobile, we assume that there are two types of workers and mobile skilled
workers. By integrating Fujita and Thisse (2003) and Yamamoto (2003), a
richer implication is obtained.
In our model, the economy has two trade patterns, one in which inter-
regional trade of final good occurs, and one in which it does not. The econ-
omy has both trade patterns simultaneously or only the latter trade pattern.
Which economy will emerge depends on the relationship between transporta-
tion costs of final good and those of intermediate goods. When transportation
costs of intermediate goods are relatively high, the former economy occurs.
When transportation costs of intermediate goods are relatively low, the latter
economy emerges. It is possible for the economy to reach the following spa-
tial configurations: full agglomeration, partial agglomeration, and segmented
agglomeration. In full agglomeration, the innovation sector and intermediate
goods sector agglomerate in one region. In partial agglomeration, interme-
diate goods firms partially agglomerate in the region where the innovation
sector agglomerates perfectly. In segmented agglomeration, the innovation
sector agglomerates in one region, and all intermediate goods firms agglomer-
ate perfectly in the other. The innovation sector always agglomerates in one
region. This is because the more skilled workers agglomerate in one region,
the higher their wage rate due to knowledge spillovers among skilled workers.
Partial agglomeration and full agglomeration occur in both trade pat-
terns. However, segmented agglomeration does not always emerge. This
agglomeration is accomplished when transportation costs of final good are
sufficiently low and those of intermediate goods are relatively high. The
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reason that this agglomeration might occur is as follows. Since there are
transportation costs for intermediate goods, final good firms and intermedi-
ate goods firms tend to locate in one region. When transportation costs of
final good are sufficiently low, under some situations, it might be profitable
for skilled workers to agglomerate in the region where final good firms do not
locate and to consume final good while paying transportation costs.
We investigate the welfare of skilled workers in each agglomeration. The
welfare in full agglomeration is always the highest. However, the welfare
in segmented agglomeration may not necessarily be the lowest in spite of
requiring transportation costs for final good. When transportation costs of
final good are not too low and if the initial distribution of skilled workers
in the region where the final good sector does not operate is high, skilled
workers will tend to agglomerate in this region, even if they can increase
their welfare by means of agglomeration in the region where final good firms
agglomerate.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the basic model is
presented, and the two patterns relating to final good trade are described. In
section 3, the migration behavior of skilled workers is described. In section 4,
a spatial configuration under fixed distribution of skilled workers is presented.
In section 5, a spatial configuration when migration is allowed is shown. In
section 6, the welfare of the skilled workers is investigated. Section 7 is the
conclusion.
2 The model with migration
2.1 The model
The economy consists of regions A and B. There are four production sectors:
agricultural, final good, intermediate goods, and innovation. Moreover, there
are two types of labor, skilled and unskilled. The innovation sector uses only
skilled labor to produce patents, which are needed for production of interme-
diate goods. While agricultural sector uses only unskilled worker, final good
is produced by using unskilled labor and a set composed of intermediate
goods. Intermediate goods are also produced by using unskilled workers and
patent. We chose the price of agricultural goods as the numeraire. Shipping
of final good and intermediate goods incurs transportation costs that are of
the ice-berg cost form.
There exists L units of unskilled labor in the economy, which is immobile
between two regions, and L is constant over time. Each region is an iden-
tical amount of unskilled labor. Each skilled worker can move between two
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regions by incurring positive cost. The total number of skilled workers in the
economy is constant over time. Without loss of generality, the number of
skilled workers is normalized to 1. Although the number of skilled workers
is constant, growth occurs by knowledge capital.
Since our model is symmetric, we focus on the specification of region A.
The inter-temporal utility function of the consumer who consumes agricul-
tural goods and final good is given by the following form:
U =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt lnu(t)dt, (1)
where u(t) is the instantaneous utility at time t and ρ is the subject discount
rate. The instantaneous utility function is as follows: u(t) = M(t)αA(t)1−α,
where M(t) and A(t) represent the consumption of homogeneous final good
and that of agricultural good, respectively, α(0 < α < 1) is the share of
expenditures devoted to final good. Solving consumer’s problem derives the
indirect utility function of a type j consumer residing in A, vjA:
vjA = α
α(1− α)1−αp−αMA²jA, (2)
where ²jA represents the expenditure for a type j worker residing in A.
Moving from one region to the other at time t incurs cost C(t), which is
expressed in terms of an individual lifetime utility. We define the lifetime
utility of consumer j at time 0 as follows:
Uj(0) ≡ Vj(0)−
∑
h
e−ρtC(th), (3)
where th represents the sequence of time in which a consumer moves and
Vj(0) ≡
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt ln[vj(t)]dt. (4)
This expresses lifetime utility obtained by consumption of goods.
We assume that there exists a global and perfectly competitive capital
market in which bonds bear an interest rate equal to r(t) at time t. This
capital market makes interest rates in both regions equate: rA(t) = rB(t) =
r(t). We have to specify consumer j’s intertemporal budget constraint. First,
the present value of wage income of consumer j is given as follows:
Wj(0) =
∫ ∞
0
e−r¯(t)wjA(t)(t)dt, (5)
where wjA(t)(t) is the wage of consumer j residing in region A at time t and
r¯ is the average interest rate between 0 and t: r¯ = (1/t)
∫ t
0
r(τ)dτ . Using
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this presents an inter-temporal budget constraint from the flow of the budget
constraint: ∫ ∞
0
²j(t)e
−rtdt = aj(0) +Wj(0), (6)
where aj(0) is the value of initial assets. Given any location path sj(t),
s = A,B, if ²j(t) is the expenditure path, such that the lifetime utility
is maximized subject to an inter-temporal budget constraint, ²˙j(t)/²j(t) =
r(t)− ρ, at time t. Since this relationship applies to any consumer, we show
E˙(t)
E(t)
= r(t)− ρ, t ≥ 0, (7)
where E(t) is an expenditure in the economy at time t.
Turn to the supply side. First, agricultural good is produced by constant
returns to scale technology. For simplicity, suppose that the input coeffi-
cient in the production of this good is 1. Because there is no transportation
cost, the nominal wages equate between two regions, and w = 1, where w
represents the wage rate of unskilled labor. We assume that the demand
for agricultural good is sufficiently large so that the demand for agricultural
good is not satisfied when this good is produced exclusively in one region.
From this assumption, this good is produced in both regions at equilibrium.
Then, final good is produced by constant returns to scale technology un-
der perfect competition: MA(t) = I
β
A(t)L
1−β
MA(t), where MA(t) is the quantity
of final good produced in region A, LMA(t) is the demand for unskilled labor
in final good sector in region A, and β(0 < β < 1) is the share of the expen-
diture for the set of intermediate goods to the total expenditure for input
requirement. IA(t) is the composite of intermediate goods, which is given as
follows:
IA(t) =
[ ∫ N(t)
0
zi(t)
θdi
]1/θ
, (8)
where zi(t) is an intermediate input indexed by i, N(t) is the total number
of varieties available in the economy in time t, and θ represents the intensity
of the input requirement for a variety of differentiated intermediate goods. If
we set σ = 1/(1− θ), σ is the elasticity of substitution between each variety
of intermediate goods. 1
Finally, differentiated intermediate goods are produced in a monopolisti-
cally competitive sector with an increasing return-to-scale technology in each
variety. Suppose that there is no cost of discrimination. This makes each
1The sufficient condition such that agricultural good is produced in both regions in
equilibrium is α < σ/(2σ − β).
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firm produce only one variety. This implies that the number of the firms is
equal to the number of varieties available. We assume that a unit of a patent
is required when production is started and that a µ unit of unskilled labor is
also needed marginally in the production. Hence, the optimal pricing is
piA = piB =
σµ
σ − 1 , (9)
where piA (piB) represents the prices of intermediate goods produced in region
A (B). Because of equality in the price between the two regions, we denote
that piA = piB = p. The operating profit is as follows:
pi = px− µx = µx
σ − 1 , (10)
where x is the size of the firms in intermediate goods sector.
Solving problems of final good firm yields the demand for intermediate
goods locating in region A:
ziA = β[pMAMAp
−σGσ−1A + τ
1−σ
I pMBM
−σ
B G
σ−1
B ], (11)
where pMA (pMB) is the price of final good produced in region A (B), τI is
transportation costs of intermediate goods, and GA(GB) represents the price
index of intermediate goods in region A (B), which is given as follows:
GA = [nAp
1−σ + τ 1−σI nBp
1−σ]1/(1−σ), (12)
where nA(nB) is the number of intermediate goods firms locating in region
A (B) and nA + nB = N . (12) says that, given the number of intermediate
goods firms, the region with more intermediate goods firms has the lower
price index of intermediate goods. Due to the zero profit of final good firm,
the price of final good produced in region A is given as follows:
pMA = β
−β(1− β)−(1−β)GβA. (13)
From our assumption on trade cost and the demand for agricultural goods,
the wage rates of unskilled workers in two regions are 1. Thus, final good is
produced in the region that has more intermediate goods firms since the more
intermediate goods firms locate, the lower the price index of intermediate
goods is.
An innovation is needed to produce a new variety. We assume that, once
the innovation is performed, an entrepreneur can have monopoly power on
the variety produced and the choice to relocate the production facilities freely
across regions at no cost. Since a unit of patent is needed to start production
intermediate goods, the total number of varieties is equal to that of patents.
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2.2 The innovation sector
We will now turn to the innovation sector, which produces a patent by us-
ing only skilled labor. Following Fujita and Thisse (2003), the production
function of a patent in region A takes the following form:
n˙A =
KA
b
λA, , (14)
where KA represents the existing knowledge in region A, b is the requirement
of skilled labor for the production of a unit of patent, and λA represents
the number (share) of skilled workers residing in region A. Furthermore,
the knowledge stock existing in each region is determined by the interaction
among skilled workers. When we denote hj as the knowledge which worker
j has, the available knowledge in region A is 2
KA =
[ ∫ λA
0
hψj dj + η
∫ λB
0
hψj dj
] 1
ψ
, (15)
where ψ(0 < ψ < 1) represents a measurement of the complementarity among
the skilled with regard to the creation of knowledge and η(0 ≤ η ≤ 1) is the
index of knowledge spillovers between two regions. For simplicity, we assume
that the knowledge that worker j has is proportionate to the number of
existing patents in the economy, i.e., hj = N .
3 From this assumption, we
can rewrite (15) as follows: 4
KA = N [λA + ηλB]
1
ψ . (16)
To simplify the notation, we define kA = [λA + ηλB]
1/ψ. Substituting (16)
into (14), we find that n˙A = (N/b)[λA + η(λB)]
1/ψλA. Supposing that the
length of a patent is infinite, the firm producing differentiate intermediate
goods has monopoly power forever. This leads to the next motion:
N˙ = n˙A + n˙B =
N
b
[λkA(λ) + (1− λ)kB(λ)], (17)
2Audretsh and Feldman (1996) show that industries in which knowledge plays a more
important role tend to cluster spatially. Therefore, we think that this formation is not
unnatural.
3This is interpreted as the knowledge that an individual has is the entire stock accu-
mulated in the past.
4When η = 1, KA = N . This implies that knowledge is interpreted as a pure public
good. On the contrary, when η = 0, KA = Nλ
1
ψ
A . This describes a situation in which
knowledge is a local public good. Accordingly, η is interpreted as a measure of the localness
of knowledge.
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where λ ≡ λA. For simplicity of notation, we set f(λ) = λkA(λ) + (1 −
λ)kB(λ). Using f(λ), we rewrite (17) as N˙ = [f(λ)/b]N . Thus, when the
distribution of the skilled is λ, the growth rate of the number of varieties is:
5
g(λ) =
f(λ)
b
. (18)
Recalling (14), sinceKA is exogenous for the innovation sector, the marginal
product of skilled workers (or the marginal product of migration) is KA/b.
Therefore, the unit cost for the production of a patent is bwA/NkA. Free
entry and zero profit in the innovation sector make the value of a patent
developed in region A ΠA = bwA/NkA. Denoting the wage rate of skilled
workers in region A on equilibrium as w∗A, the wage is represented as follows:
w∗A =
ΠANkA
b
. (19)
In the intermediate goods sector, the value of a patent is equal to that of the
firm due to free entry at every moment t.
2.3 Trade pattern
Now, we investigate the location of the final good sector. As shown in Ya-
mamoto (2003), there are two patterns regarding the location or trade of the
final good sector in the economy: final good is produced in both regions, or
final good is produced in one region.
Since the economy is symmetric, we focus on the case 1/2 ≤ γ ≤ 1, where
γ is the share of intermediate goods firms locating in region A. This implies
that, if the agglomeration of a final good firm (perfect or not) emerges, it
will occur in region A. This is because, when 1/2 ≤ γ ≤ 1, the price index of
intermediate goods in region A is lower. From (13), it is clear that pMA≤pMB
if GA ≤ GB. Moreover, if final good is produced in both regions, the price
of final good produced in region B must be lower than the price including
transportation costs of this good produced in region A. In short, the trade
pattern of final good is stated as follows.
1. (pattern 1) If pMAτM≥pMB, final good is produced in both regions and
there is no trade of final good. 6
5It is verified that g(λ) is symmetric about 1/2 and such that g(0) = g(1) = 1/b. In
addition, it is clear that ∂g(λ)/∂η > 0 and ∂2g(λ)/∂η2 > 0. Therefore, the growth rate of
the number of varieties is the increasing function of η, and, when η = 1, the growth rate
reaches its maximum value. That is, the strength of inter-regional knowledge spillovers
affects the growth rate.
6More precisely, we have to state that, if pMA > pMB , final good is produced in both
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2. (pattern 2) If pMAτM < pMB, the production of final good is operated
only in region A and there is trade of final good.
From the above discussion, rearranging pMAτM < pMB clarifies that, if
γ is larger than a critical value, γˆ, then final goods sector operates only in
region A, where γˆ is:
γˆ ≡ 1− τ
1−σ
I τ
1−σ
β
M
(1 + τ
1−σ
β
M )(1− τ 1−σI )
, (20)
This demonstrates that γˆ > 1/2. Moreover, it is obvious that, if γˆ > 1, then
the following relationship holds:
τM > τ
β
I . (21)
When (21) holds, perfect agglomeration of final good firm in region A cannot
occur. This is due to the relatively high transportation costs of final good
compared to those of intermediate goods.
Then, we investigate the prospect for the economy when the trade is in
pattern 2. If intermediate goods firms work in both regions, the operating
profit (the output) must be equal between two regions. In short, 1/2 < γ < 1
if xA = xB, and γ = 1 otherwise. Substituting nA > 0 and nB = 0 into (11)
indicates that piA > piB (xA > xB). Therefore, when the trade is in pattern
2, γ = 1 holds.
Now, we examine what happens when the trade is in pattern 1. In pattern
1, intermediate goods firms locate in both regions, which implies that the
output is equal between two regions. This shows the following relationship:
Gβ+σ−1A EA = G
β+σ−1
B EB, (22)
where EA (EB) is the expenditure of region A (B). If γ = 1/2 and λ = 1/2,
GA = GB and EA = EB. That is, nA = nB. Therefore, it is obvious that,
when γ = 1/2 and λ = 1/2, (22) holds. However, we would like to focus on
the equilibrium that 1/2 < γ ≤ 1 and 1/2 < λ ≤ 1. Here, note that the
expenditure in each region cannot be determined until λ is satisfied.
Rearranging (22) reveals the share of intermediate goods firms located in
a region, γ, which is given as follows.
γ =
EA
EB
− τ 1−σI
(1− τ 1−σI )(EAEB + 1)
. (23)
regions, and there is no trade of final good. However, suppose that if pMA = pMB , final
good is also produced in both regions and there is no trade final good.
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This shows that, if the expenditure ratio and transportation costs of inter-
mediate goods rise, the share of intermediate goods firms locating in region
A increases. This is due to transportation costs of intermediate goods and
scale economy of producing intermediate goods.
From the above discussion, it is found that all equilibria are in pattern 1 or
pattern 2. This implies that there is no equilibrium such that intermediate
goods firms agglomerate in a region in which final good sector does not
agglomerate. This is because final good can be produced with lower cost if
final good firm locates in the region in which the number of intermediate
goods firms is higher.
We will now turn to the labor market. Since unskilled labor is used in all
sectors except the innovation sector, the clearing condition for the unskilled
labor market is
LA + LMA + LMB + LIA + LIB = L, (24)
where LA is the demand for unskilled labor in the agricultural sector, LMA
(LMB) is the demand for unskilled labor in the final good sector in segion A
(B), LIA (LIB) is the demand for unskilled labor in the intermediate goods
sector in region A (B), and L is the amount of unskilled labor supply in the
economy. Deriving the clearing condition for unskilled labor markets in each
sector and substituting these outcomes into (24), we show the relationship
between unskilled labor and expenditure in the economy: E = σL/(σ−αβ).
This implies that, if L is constant, then E is also constant. Hence, E is
constant due to the assumption that L is constant. This leads to r(t) = ρ
from (7). We find that the equilibrium interest rate is equal to the subjective
discount rate.
Here, we need to specify the income of each worker. An intertemporal
budget constraint derives ²j = ρ[aj(0)+Wj(0)]. We assume that intermediate
goods firms are equally possessed among only skilled workers. 7 This implies
aL = 0. From (5), the present value of the wage income of the unskilled
is
∫∞
0
e−ρtw(t)dt = 1/ρ, since w = 1. The income of skilled workers is also
represented as follows:
²H = ρ[aH(0) +WH(0)]. (25)
From the assumption, the initial endowment of the skilled is given the fol-
lowing form:
aH(0) = nA(0)ΠA + nB(0)ΠB. (26)
7Picard et al. (2004) have shown that the spatial configuration is affected by the
structure of the ownership of firms working under monopolistic competition. In our model,
the simplest case as to ownership of the firms is considered.
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Note that ²H(0) is determined by the present value of income and the equi-
librium wage rate of skilled workers.
3 Migration behavior
Recall the assumption that migration between two regions incurs the loss
of utility. Following Fujita and Thisse (2003), the migration cost takes the
following form: 8
C(t) =
|λ˙(t)|
Ψ
. (27)
The left-hand side represents the cost in terms of the utility loss for migrant
time at t. As for the right-hand side, λ˙ represents the flow of skilled workers
moving from one region to the other and Ψ is a positive constant interpreted
as an adjustment cost. When skilled workers move from region B to A, λ˙ is
positive. On the contrary, when skilled workers move from region A to B, λ˙
is negative.
Consider the following case, which will be relevant for the stability of
analysis of the steady state at λ˜ ∈ [0, 1]. Let the initial distribution of the
skilled be lower than λ˜. Suppose that T > 0 exists such that the flow of
skilled workers from B to A starts at time 0 and stops at time T . Briefly,
this is stated as follows:
λ˙(t) > 0 t ∈ (0, T )
λ(t) = λ˜ t≤T (28)
In this case, the equilibrium dynamics of skilled workers under the expec-
tation (28) is derived as the following form:
λ˙(t) =
Ψeρt
ρ
ln
[
aH(0) +WH(0; t)
aH(0) +WH(0;T )
]
− αΨeρt
∫ T
t
e−ρs ln
pY A(s)
pY B(s)
ds (29)
for any t ∈ (0, T ). The process of deriving (29) is shown in Appendix 1.
In the next section, we investigate the equilibrium when λ is fixed.
4 The steady-state growth path when λ is
fixed.
In this section, we investigate the steady-state growth path under fixed λ.
8The migration cost is interpreted as a congestion cost.
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4.1 Location of the intermediate goods sector
The objective in this subsection is to find the location of intermediate sector,
γ, given the distribution of the skilled, λ. To show this, some preparation is
required.
Here, we find the profit (the output) of intermediate goods firms. Note
that intermediate goods firms are free to chose the region where they work
because patents are perfectly mobile. First, we derive the profits when in-
termediate goods firms locate in both regions. In this case, xA = xB holds.
Using (22), nA+nB = N and EA+EB = E yield the number of intermediate
goods firms in each region:
nA =
EA − τ 1−σI EB
(1− τ 1−σI )E
N, nB =
EB − τ 1−σI EA
(1− τ 1−σI )E
N. (30)
It is obvious that nA > 0 and nB > 0 if and only if τ
1−σ
I < (EA/EB) < 1/τ
1−σ
I .
(11) reveals the output of intermediate goods firms in both regions. This is
xA = xB =
αβ(σ − 1)
σµN
E.
Then, it is shown that nA = N and nB = 0 if and only if 1/τ
1−σ
I ≤ (EA/EB).
In this case, the output of intermediate goods firms in each region is
xA =
αβ(σ − 1)
σµN
E ≥ αβ(σ − 1)
σµN
(τ 1−σI EA + τ
σ−1
I EB) = xB.
Finally, it is also found that nA = 0 and nB = N if and only if τ
1−σ
I ≥
(EA/EB). In this case, the output of intermediate goods firms in each region
is
xA =
αβ(σ − 1)
σµN
(τσ−1I EA + τ
1−σ
I EB) ≤
αβ(σ − 1)
σµN
E = xB.
Since intermediate goods firms choose the region in which their own profit is
larger, the equilibrium profits of intermediate goods firms are
pi = max{piA, piB} = αβ
σN
E. (31)
From (17) and (18), it is clear that the total number of intermediate
goods in the economy is N(t) = N(0)eg(λ)t, where N(0) is the initial num-
ber of varieties in the economy. Since the value of each intermediate goods
firm is Π(t) =
∫∞
t
e−ρ(τ−t)pi(τ)dτ and E is constant, the aggregate value of
13
intermediate goods firms in the economy is given as follows and denoted as
a˜(λ);
N(t)Π(t) =
αβE
σ(ρ+ g(λ))
≡ a˜(λ). (32)
Substituting (32) into (19) derives the wage rate of skilled workers in each
region. Note that the aggregate expenditure in each region at any time
is Es(λ) = (L/2) + λs²s(λ). Using this yields the ratio of the aggregate
expenditure in region A to that in region B as follows:
EA(λ)
EB(λ)
=
L
2
+ λa˜(λ)
[
ρ+ (λ+η(1−λ))
1/ψ
b
]
L
2
+ (1− λ)a˜(λ)[ρ+ (ηλ+1−λ)1/ψ
b
] . (33)
Substituting λ = 1, 1/2, and 0 into this shows that EA(1)/EB(1) > 1,
EA(1/2)/EB(1/2) = 1, EA(0)/EB(0) < 1.
9
Here, we show the relationship between the expenditure ratio and λ. The
process used to explore this relationship is shown in Appendix 2. As a result,
the following relationship holds:
d[EA(λ)/EB(λ)]
dλ
> 0, λ ∈ (0, 1). (34)
This suggests that γ is an increasing function of the expenditure ratio and
the expenditure ratio increases monotonously as λ rises. This is described in
the figures. Figure 1 describes the case in which τ
−(1−σ)
I < (σ+αβ)/(σ−αβ).
In this case, intermediate goods firms locate in both regions for any λ. On
the other hand, Figure 2 represents the case τ
−(1−σ)
I ≥ (σ + αβ)/(σ − αβ).
In this case, there are two configurations. One is that in which intermediate
goods are produced in both regions. The other is that in which intermediate
goods sector works in one region. The former will emerge if λ is sufficiently
close to 1/2, (i.e., λ′′ < λ < λ′). 10 The latter will occur if λ is sufficiently
close to 1 or 0 (i.e., λ′′ < λ or λ < λ′). In other words, if the difference of the
number of skilled workers is large, intermediate goods firms will agglomerate
in the region in which more skilled workers reside, and if the difference is not
large, intermediate goods firms will locate in both regions and will partially
9Writing more precisely, it is clear that
EA(1)
EB(1)
=
σ + αβ
σ − αβ > 1,
EA(1/2)
EB(1/2)
= 1,
EA(0)
EB(0)
=
σ − αβ
σ + αβ
< 1.
10λ′ and λ′′ are the values associated with EA(λ′)/EB(λ′) = τ
−(1−σ)
I and
EA(λ′′)/EB(λ′′) = τ1−σI , respectively.
14
agglomerate in the region in which more skilled workers reside. Agglom-
eration of intermediate goods firms is derived from the home market effect
through the demand for final good.
When the location is pattern 2, intermediate goods firms perfectly ag-
glomerate in the region where final good firms agglomerate, as mentioned
before.
5 The steady-state growth path when migra-
tion is allowed.
In this section, we investigate the steady state when migration of skilled
workers is allowed. To do this, the lifetime utility of skilled workers is nec-
essary in two regions associated with the growth path under any fixed λ. In
the course of this process, the values of λ in equilibrium are acquired. The
lifetime utility of skilled workers in region s is shown as follows:
Vs =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt ln vs(t;λ, γ)dt, (35)
where Vs is the lifetime utility of skilled workers in region s and vs(t;λ, γ) is
the instantaneous utility at time t. From this, the difference of the lifetime
utility of skilled workers between the two regions is
VA(0;λ, γ)− VB(0;λ, γ) =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt ln
[
vA(t;λ, γ)
vB(t;λ, γ)
]
. (36)
The expenditure for skilled workers in each region is represented as follows:
²s(λ) = a˜(λ)
[
ρ+
ks(λ)
b
]
. (37)
First, an effort is made to determine the locations in which pattern 1
appears.
5.1 The steady-state growth path when trade is in pat-
tern 1
In this pattern, final good firm does not engage in trade. Deriving the ratio
between the indirect utility in region A to that in region B from (2) and (13)
and setting Φ1(λ, γ) = vA(t;λ, γ)/vB(t;λ, γ), the difference of the lifetime
15
utility is rewritten as follows: 11
VA(0;λ, γ)− VB(0;λ, γ) =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt lnΦ1(λ, γ) =
1
ρ
lnΦ1(λ, γ). (38)
This implies that VA will be larger (smaller) than VB if Φ1 is larger (smaller)
than 1. Recall that GA = GB and kA = kB when γ = 1/2 and λ = 1/2.
Thus, it is obvious that VA(0; 1/2, 1/2) = VB(0; 1/2, 1/2) holds. This implies
that full dispersion (λ = 1/2, γ = 1/2) is always the steady-state equilibrium.
Recall that ∂kA(λ)/∂λ > 0, ∂kB(λ)/∂λ < 0, and kA(λ) = kB(λ) = 1 for
η = 1. Hence, for any η > 0,
∂Φ1(λ, γ)
∂λ
≥ 0, ∂Φ1(λ, γ)
∂γ
≥ 0, λ ∈ (0, 1), γ ∈ (0, 1).
Hence, it is determined that VA will be larger (smaller) than VB if γ and λ are
larger (smaller) than 1/2. This states that the economy is on a steady-state
equilibrium under λ = 0, 1/2, 1. We denote λ in steady-state equilibrium as
λ˜. It is shown in Appendix 3 that λ˜ = 1/2 is unstable and λ˜ = 0, 1 is stable.
As shown in Fujita and Thisse (2001), the self-fulfilling nature of the
migration process makes stability more difficult to define. It is possible that
several perfect foresight solution under the same initial distribution of skilled
worker, λ0 in our model. As a result, for a given steady-state growth path
under λ˜(= 0, 1/2, 1), there might be a neighborhood Λ of λ˜ such that, for any
λ0 ∈ λ, the equilibrium path based on a particular expectation converges to
this steady-state growth path while another equilibrium path diverges from
the same steady-state growth path. To avoid such a difficulty, following
Fujita and Thisse (2001), we impose some restrictions on the expectations
that have to be satisfied when an equilibrium path converges into a steady-
state growth path. Due to perfect foresight, this is amounts to imposing a
restriction on the equilibrium path itself. Hence, we introduce the following
restrictions.
Suppose that λ˜ ∈ [0, 1] and λ0 ∈ [0, 1] are not equal. If λ(t) is an equi-
librium path satisfying the initial condition, λ0, this path satisfies the mono-
tonic convergence hypothesis under λ˜ (we call this the mc-hypothesis) when
0 < T ≤ ∞ such that,
when λ0 < λ˜, λ˙(t) > 0, for t ∈ (0, T ),
11From (2) and (13), we find that the ratio of the indirect utility in region A to that in
region B is as follows:
vA(t;λ, γ)
vB(t;λ, γ)
=
[
γ + τ1−σI (1− γ)
τ1−σI γ + 1− γ
]−αβ/(1−σ)
bρ+ kA(λ)
bρ+ kB(λ)
.
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λ(t) = λ˜, for t ≤ T, (39)
when λ0 > λ˜, λ˙(t) < 0, for t ∈ (0, T ),
λ(t) = λ˜, for t ≤ T. (40)
The steady-state growth path under λ˜ will be stable if there is a neighborhood
Λ of λ˜ such that, for each λ0 ∈ Λ with λ0 6= λ˜, there is an equilibrium path
that satisfies the mc-hypothesis under λ˜. The steady-state growth path will
not be stable otherwise. We show in Appendix 3 that λ = 0, 1 is stable under
λ˜.
The location of intermediate goods firms in the case of λ = 1 remains to be
studied. As mentioned in 4.1, when λ = 1, the configuration of intermediate
goods firms is determined by the relationship between the expenditure ratio
and transportation costs of intermediate goods.
First, we investigate the location of the intermediate goods sector when
τ 1−σI < (σ − αβ)/(σ + αβ). In this case, the definitions of λ′ and λ′′ expose
the following relationship:
EA(λ
′)
EB(λ′)
=
1
τ 1−σI
>
σ + αβ
σ − αβ =
EA(1)
EB(1)
,
EA(λ
′′)
EB(λ′′)
= τ 1−σI <
σ − αβ
σ + αβ
=
EA(0)
EB(0)
.
Due to d[EA(λ)/EB(λ)]/dλ > 0, it is clear that λ
′ > 1 and λ′′ < 0. In
addition, for λ ∈ (0, 1), τ 1−σI < EA(λ)/EB(λ) < τ−(1−σ)I holds. This situation
is described in Figure 3. Note that λ moves gradually and γ is able to jump
due to the assumption that skilled workers can move while incurring costs
and intermediate goods firms can move freely. The points on the curve in
Figure 3 satisfy the location equilibrium. This is so because of the following
reason. Below the curve, Gβ+σ−1A MA < G
β+σ−1
B MB holds, which implies that
xA < xB holds. That is, the profits of intermediate goods firms in region B
are higher than those in region A. Hence, the vertical line through γ = 1 does
not satisfy the location equilibrium. Above the curve, the opposite is true.
12 In short, we find that, when τ 1−σI < (σ − αβ)/(σ + αβ), a configuration
in which intermediate goods firms always locate in both regions is chosen as
the steady state. We denote this steady state as partial agglomeration under
no trade in region s, (s=A, B) (PAN in s), where s represents the region in
which the innovation sector locates.
Next, we consider the case τ 1−σI ≥ (σ−αβ)/(σ+αβ) in the same way. It
is obvious that λ′ ≤ 1 and λ′′ ≥ 0. 13 This situation is described in Figure 4.
12Of course, due to the symmetry of the model, the points satisfy γ = 0 but not the
location equilibrium.
13Written more precisely, it is clear that
EA(λ′)
EB(λ′)
= τ−(1−σ)I ≤
σ + αβ
σ − αβ =
EA(1)
EB(1)
,
EA(λ′′)
EB(λ′′)
= τ1−σI ≥
σ − αβ
σ + αβ
=
EA(0)
EB(0)
.
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The points on the curve satisfy the location equilibrium. The reason is given
above. In this case, the steady state occurs when all intermediate goods firms
and the innovation sector agglomerate in one region. We denote this steady
state as full agglomeration under no trade in region s, (s=A, B) (FAN in s).
We summarize the above discussion as a proposition.
Proposition 1 When there is no trade of final good (τβI ≤ τM), the stable
equilibrium is as follows:
• if transportation costs of intermediate goods are sufficiently high (τ 1−σI <
[σ − αβ]/[σ + αβ]), PAN in s (s=A, B) occurs.
• if transportation costs of intermediate goods are sufficiently low (τ 1−σI ≥
[σ − αβ]/[σ + αβ]), FAN in s (s=A, B) emerges.
• As transportation costs of intermediate goods become lower, this change
occurs more smoothly.
5.2 The steady-state growth path when trade is in pat-
tern 2
We investigate this in the same manner shown in the previous subsection.
Setting Φ2(λ) = vA(t;λ, γ)/vB(t;λ, γ), the difference of the utility of skilled
workers in region A and region B is represented as follows: 14
VA(0;λ, γ)− VB(0;λ, γ) =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt lnΦ2(λ)dt =
1
ρ
lnΦ2(λ). (41)
It is clear that VA is larger (smaller) than VB if Φ2(λ) is larger (smaller) than
1. We denote the value associated with Φ2(λ) = 1 as λˆ. As mentioned before,
it is shown that ∂kA(λ)/∂λ > 0 and ∂kB(λ)/∂λ < 0 and that, when η = 1,
kA(λ) = kB(λ) = 1 for all λ. Thus, it is clear that, for any η > 0,
dΦ2(λ)
dλ
≥ 0, λ ∈ (0, 1). (42)
14When the difference in the indirect utility of skilled workers in each region is derived
by the same manner presented in previous subsection, this is represented as follows:
vA(t;λ, γ)
vB(t;λ, γ)
=
²jA
τ−αM ²jB
=
bρ+ kA(λ)
bρ+ kB(λ)
1
τ−αM
.
Note that this is dependent on only λ.
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This implies that VA(λ) is larger (smaller) than VB(λ) if λ is larger (smaller)
than λˆ.
Now, we need to investigate the property of λˆ. From the definition of
λˆ, bρ + kA(λˆ) = [bρ + kB(λˆ)]τ
−α
M must hold. Rearranging this by using the
definition of ks, s = A,B yields the following relationship:
(1− τ−αM )bρ = τ−αM (ηλˆ+ 1− λˆ)
1
ψ − (λˆ+ η(1− λˆ)) 1ψ .
Differentiating this equation reveals the following relationship:
dλˆ
dτM
< 0. (43)
In addition, it is clear that, when τM ≥ τˆM , λˆ ≤ 0, where
τˆM =
(
bρ+ η
1
ψ
bρ+ 1
)− 1
α
(44)
If transportation costs of final good are higher than τˆM , λˆ will be less than 0,
that is, λˆ will not exist. In this case, residing in region B is not profitable for
the skilled, since transportation costs of final good are not sufficiently low.
Hence, the skilled do not locate in region B. However, if transportation costs
of final good decrease so that the value of τM exceeds τˆM , λˆ will be larger than
zero. When this happens, there is a range of λ such that locating in region
B is profitable for skilled workers due to sufficiently low transportation costs
of final good. In this case, if the initial share of the skilled workers in region
A, λ0, is larger than λˆ, the steady state will be a case in which all sectors
agglomerate in region A, and, if that is lower than λˆ, final good sector and
all intermediate goods firms will agglomerate in one region, and the skilled
workers will agglomerate in the other. We denote the former steady state as
full agglomeration under trade in region A (FAT in A) and the latter one as
segmented agglomeration under trade in region B (SAT in B).
From the above discussion, it is clear that the economy in this pattern
is on a steady state equilibrium under λ = 0, λˆ, and 1 when τM ≤ τˆM and
on a steady state under λ = 1 when τM > τˆM . We denote the value of λ on
steady state equilibrium as λ˜. Using the same technique shown in Appendix
3, it is demonstrated that, if τM ≤ τˆM , λ˜ = λˆ is unstable and λ˜ = 0 and
1 are stable; if τM > τˆM , λ = 1 is stable. That is, the stable steady state
is FTA or SAT. The steady state that the economy reaches is determined
by transportation costs of final good and the initial distribution of skilled
workers. Due to the symmetry of the model, there is the value of λ, which
resembled λˆ. We denote this value as λ¯.
19
We summarize the above discussion as the following proposition. 15
Proposition 2 When there is trade of final good, the stable steady state is
FAT in A or SAT in B. Which steady state occurs depends on transportation
costs of final good and the initial distribution of skilled workers.
• If τM ≥ τˆM , FAT in A occurs regardless of the initial distribution of
the skilled.
• If τM < τˆM and λˆ < λ0, FAT in A will emerge.
• If τM < τˆM and λˆ > λ0, SAT in B will occur.
It is interesting to investigate what happens in the entire economy. It
must be recalled that the trade is only in pattern 1 when τβI ≤ τM and both
trade patterns occur simultaneously in the economy when τβI > τM . The
economy under pattern 1 of trade has already been shown in the previous
subsection. Therefore, studying an economy in which both trade patterns
occur simultaneously is a very interesting proposition.
First, the relationship among τI , τM , and γˆ is shown. From (20), it is
obvious that ∂γˆ/∂τI < 0, ∂γˆ/∂τM > 0. In addition, (23) and EA(1)/EB(1) =
(σ−αβ)/(σ+αβ) yield that the values of γ = γˆ and λ = 1 hold if τM = τ¯M ,
where
τ¯M ≡
(
σ − αβ
σ + αβ
)β/(1−σ)
. (45)
As mentioned before, if the value of γ reaches γˆ, then the trade pattern
will change instantaneously, which implies the number of the possible steady
states which the economy can reach is determined by transportation costs
of final good. That is, the relationship among τM , τˆM , and τ¯M affects the
number of steady states that the economy reaches.
The relationship between τˆM and τ¯M is then presented. Using (44) and
(45), it is shown that τˆM > τ¯M holds if the expenditure share for final good, α,
the subject discount rate, ρ, and the expenditure share for intermediate goods
in final good sector, β, are low and the elasticity of substitution between any
varieties of intermediate goods, σ, is high. In this paper, we focus on a
developed economy. Therefore, we assume τˆM ≤ τ¯M .
The above relationships present the economy under τˆM ≤ τ¯M < τM in
Figure 5. Recall that λ moves gradually and γ can jump. In this case, the
15Consider the pattern in which the final good sector locates in region B. When τM > τˆM ,
the steady state is FAT in B regardless of the initial distribution of skilled workers. When
τM < τˆM , if λ0 < λ¯, the steady state is FAT in B, and, if λ0 > λ¯, the steady state is SAT
in A.
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economy has four multiple equilibria (PAN in A, PAN in B, FAT in A, and
FAT in B) regardless of the initial distribution of the skilled. The steady
state chosen by the economy is determined by expectation. 16
Proposition 3 When τβI > τM , if τˆM ≤ τ¯M < τM , the stable steady state is
PAN in s, or FAT in s (s=A, B), regardless of the initial distribution of the
skilled. 17
Finally, the value λ associated with γ = γˆ when τM < τ¯M is found.
Denote this value as λ∗. It is clear from (23) that 18
EA(λ
∗)
EB(λ∗)
= τ
− 1−σ
β
M .
This implies that EA(λ
∗)/EB(λ∗) < EA(1)/EB(1), which derives λ∗ < 1 due
to the fact that d[EA(λ)/EB(λ)]/dλ > 0.
19 In addition, it is found that
there is a value of λ that is analogous to λ∗, which is called λ∗∗, and it is
obvious that λ∗∗ > 0 since the model is symmetric. 20
In Figure 7, we show the economy when τˆM ≤ τM ≤ τ¯M . In this case,
the economy has two multiple equlibria (FAT in A and FAT in B) regardless
of the initial distribution of the skilled. The steady state that the economy
chooses is determined by expectation.
In Figure 8, we show the economy when τM < τˆM ≤ τ¯M . In this case, the
economy has four steady states (FAT in A, FAT in B, SAT in A, and SAT in
B). When the initial distribution of the skilled is lower than λˆ, it is possible
16We describe the economy in Figure 6 under the condition that τ¯M < τM < τˆM holds.
In this case, the economy has six multiple equilibria (PAN in A, PAN in B, FAT in A,
FAT in B, SAT in A, and SAT in B). The steady state that the economy might reach
is determined by the initial distribution of skilled workers and the expectation. When
λ0 ≤ λˆ, there are three steady states that the economy might reach (PAN in B, FAN in B,
and SAT in A). When λ0 ≥ λ¯, the number of steady states that the economy might reach
might be three (PAN in A, FAN in A, and SAT in B). When λˆ < λ0 < λ¯, the economy has
the potential to reach each steady state. Given the initial distribution of skilled workers,
the steady state is determined by expectation.
17When τβI ≤ τM , if τ¯M < τM < τˆM and λ0 ≤ λˆ, the steady state is FAT in B, PAN in
B, or SAT in A; if τ¯M < τM < τˆM and λ0 ≥ λ¯, the steady state is FAT in A, PAN in A,
or SAT in B; if τ¯M < τM < τˆM and λˆ < λ0 < λ¯, the economy has the potential to reach
each steady state.
18Of course, from this equation, it is also shown that, when τM = τ¯M , EA(λ∗)/EB(λ∗) =
(σ + αβ)/(σ − αβ) holds. Hence, we find that λ∗ = 1, in this case.
19This is because of EA(λ∗)/EB(λ∗) < (σ + αβ)/(σ − αβ) and EA(1)/EB(1) = (σ +
αβ)/(σ − αβ).
20More precisely, λ∗∗ is the value at which intermediate goods firms begin to agglomerate
in region B and the trade pattern changes in the case that τM < τ¯M .
21
for the economy to reach one of two steady states (FAT in B and SAT in
A). When the initial distribution of the skilled is higher than λ¯, there are
two steady states that the economy might reach (FAT in A and SAT in B).
When λˆ < λ0 < λ¯, the economy has the potential to reach four steady states.
Given the initial distribution of the skilled, the steady state is determined
by expectation.
We summarize the above discussion as follows.
Proposition 4 When τβI > τM ,
• if τˆM ≤ τM ≤ τ¯M , the stable steady state is FAT in s (s=A, B), regard-
less of the initial distribution of the skilled;
• if τM < τˆM ≤ τ¯M and λ0 < λˆ, steady state is FAT in B or SAT in A;
• if τM < τˆM ≤ τ¯M and λ0 > λ¯, the steady state is FAT in A or SAT in
B;
• if τM < τˆM ≤ τ¯M and λˆ < λ0 < λ¯, the economy will have the potential
to reach four steady states.
5.3 Discussion
In this section, we discuss the effect of changes in transportation costs of final
good, τM , and those of intermediate goods, τI , on the spatial configuration.
When transportation costs of intermediate goods are relatively higher than
those of final good, τβI > τM . In this case, both trade patterns emerge
in the economy. Then, the economy will reach partial agglomeration or
full agglomeration (Figure 5). Which spatial configuration it will reach is
determined by expectation.
Suppose that transportation costs of final good are reduced. The reduc-
tions of those costs results in partial agglomeration ceasing to exist. Thus,
the economy will reach only full agglomeration (Figure 7). The relatively
high transportation costs of intermediate goods cause the linkage between
final good firm and intermediate goods firms to be strong, which leads to full
agglomeration. Moreover, skilled workers think that it is preferable to reside
in the region where final good sector locates since transportation costs of final
good are not sufficiently low. We think that this situation is representative
of the fact that urban population growth is linked with the development of
transportation technology, shown in Bairoch (1988).
Now, suppose that transportation costs of intermediate goods decline.
We think that this is possible because of the development of communication
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technology. When the reductions in transportation costs of intermediate
goods are sufficient to hold τβI ≤ τM , the trade pattern changes, and trade
of final good, consequently, there is no trade of final good. This is because
transportation costs of final good are relatively high. Thus, final good sector
tends to locate in both regions to save on transportation costs. The reduction
of transportation costs of intermediate goods in 1950 is shown in Baldwin et
al. (2001). In addition, a regional distribution of manufacturing employment
from 1850-1990 is seen in Hanson (1993). It was then shown that, in 1950,
the progress of dispersion in manufacturing was faster.
How the economy is affected by the change of transportation costs in this
situation is stated. At first, the economy will accomplish partial agglomera-
tion under no trade (Figure 3) due to the linkage between final good firm and
intermediate goods firms. However, as transportation costs of intermediate
goods continue to decline, the steady state is only full agglomeration under
no trade (Figure 4). This is because it is profitable for intermediate goods
firms to agglomerate in the region where skilled workers locate. This is de-
rived from the indirect effect through final good, which are consumed more
in the region where skilled workers agglomerate. Now, suppose that trans-
portation costs of final good decline and τβI > τM thus holds. This might be
derived by, for instance, the improvements in the technology associated with
the delivery of goods. The steady state is full agglomeration under trade
or segmented agglomeration under trade (Figure 8). Which steady state
is accomplished is determined by expectation. If the expectation leads to
segmented agglomeration in the economy, this spatial configuration will be
fulfilled. This case is described in Audretsh and Feldman (1996), who showed
that the agglomeration of production does not attract the agglomeration of
innovation. Workers who have a special ability tend to agglomerate in one
region to enjoy spillovers that are the most important for innovation activity.
The region in which the innovation sector agglomerates is not necessarily the
one in which the activities of production of goods agglomerate.
6 Welfare
In this subsection, we investigate the welfare under FAT in A, PAN in A,
and SAT in B when both trade patterns emerge. 21 The welfare gap between
each equilibrium is shown by using (2) and (13). 22 For simplicity, we omit
21Since the model is symmetric, we focus on the case in which final good sector agglom-
erates in region A when this sector agglomerates.
22Note that workers in the region in which final good firms locate can always acquire
final good without transportation costs and the wage rate of skilled workers does not
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the superscript, which represents skilled workers, H. First, the welfare under
FAT in A with that under PAN in A is compared. The ratio of the welfare
between two steady states is given by the following form;
vA(t; 1, 1)
vA(t; 1, γ)
=
[
GA(1)
GA(γ)
]−αβ
= [γ + τ 1−σI (1− γ)]
αβ
1−σ > 1.
Thus, it is clear that VA(0; 1, 1) − VA(0; 1, γ) > 0. This implies that, for
skilled workers residing in region A, welfare in a case in which intermediate
goods firms agglomerate in region A is higher than that in a case in which
intermediate goods firms locate in both regions. This is because the price
index is lower in the region that has more intermediate goods firms.
Next, the relationship between the welfare of PAN in A and that of SAT
in B is as follows. 23
vA(t; 1, 1)
vB(t; 0, 1)
=
[
pY A
pY B
]−α
= ταM > 1.
Therefore, it is obvious that VA(0; 1, 1) − VB(0; 0, 1) > 0. This is due to
the fact that workers residing in region A can acquire final good without
transportation costs.
Finally, the welfare of PAN in A with that of SAT in B is shown. This is
written as follows:
vA(t; 1, γ)
vB(t; 0, 1)
= [γ + τ 1−σI (1− γ)]
αβ
σ−1 ταM ≥ (<)1 as γ ≥ (<)γ∗.
where
γ∗ =
τ
1−σ
β
M − τ 1−σI
1− τ 1−σI
.
Whether the ratio of the welfare in this case is larger than 1 or not depends on
the value of γ at PAN in A. Using (23) and EA(1)/EB(1) = (σ+αβ)/(σ−αβ)
derives the value of γ under λ = 1:
γ =
σ + αβ − τ 1−σI (σ − αβ)
2σ(1− τ 1−σI )
.
Computing using the two equations above reveals the following relationship:
VA(0; 1, γ)− VB(0; 0, 1) ≤ (>)0 as τ 1−σI ≥ (<)
2σ
σ + αβ
τ
1−σ
β
M − 1.
change if the value of λ does not vary. In addition, the price of final good is affected by
the location of intermediate goods firms.
23We have already shown that the wage rate of the skilled when λ = 1 is equal to that
when λ = 0.
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This is interpreted as follows. τ 1−σI > [2σ/(σ + αβ)]τ
1−σ
beta
M − 1 means trans-
portation costs of intermediate goods are relatively low. While skilled work-
ers residing in region A can acquire final good without paying transportation
costs, those residing in region B can consume final good while incurring
transportation costs. In addition, the cost of final good producer when the
economy is under PAN in A is higher than when the economy is under SAT
in B. From the discussion above, the inequality is determined by the rela-
tionship between transportation costs of final good and those of intermediate
goods.
Note that if τ 1−σI < [2σ/(σ+αβ]τ
(1−σ)/β
M − 1, the welfare under SAT in B
is lowest. However, the skilled workers tend to agglomerate in region B even
if they can increase their welfare by means of agglomeration in region A.
The discussion above is summarized as follows:
Proposition 5 The welfare of the skilled on FAT in A is the highest. The
welfare on SAT in B is higher than that on PAN in A, if the following rela-
tionship holds:
τ 1−σI >
2σ
σ + αβ
τ
1−σ
β
M − 1.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, a Grossman-Helpman-Romer-type endogenous growth model
is developed with two regions. We show that there are multiple equilibria in
our economy. In addition, we investigate the welfare of skilled workers at the
steady state.
In our economy, there always exist multiple equilibria. Note that the
economy has the potential to achieve segmented agglomeration. This de-
scribes the situation in which agglomeration of an innovation sector and
agglomeration of production in manufacturing sector are spatially separate.
The relationship between transportation costs of final good and those of
intermediate goods determines the number of steady states that there are in
the economy. The steady state that the economy achieves is determined by
expectation and the initial distribution of the skilled. This implies that, in
the case in which expectation plays an important role, the government of a
region that would like to have agglomeration of firms and workers needs to
implement some coordination.
We investigate the level of welfare of skilled workers. Not surprisingly,
the welfare in full agglomeration is the highest. However, the relative mag-
nitude between the welfare in partial agglomeration and that in segmented
agglomeration depends on the relationship between the transportation costs
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of final good and those of intermediate goods. It is possible for the economy
to reach segmented agglomeration even if their welfare at this agglomera-
tion is lowest. This shows that coordination failure occurs. From the point
of welfare analysis, some policies are needed to acquire the highest level of
welfare.
Appendix
Appendix 1
First, using (2), (4), and (25), we present the lifetime wage of the skilled who
migrates from B to A at time t as follows:
W (0; t) =
∫ t
0
e−ρτwB(τ)dτ +
∫ ∞
t
e−ρτwA(τ)dτ. (A.1)
Then, using (3) and (27), the lifetime utility is given by
U(0; t) = V (0; t)− eρt λ˙(t)
Ψ
, (A.2)
where V (0; t) is the lifetime utility gross of migration costs. V (0; t) is shown
as follows:
V (0; t) =
1
ρ
ln ρ+
1
ρ
ln[aH(0)+WH(0)]−α
[ ∫ t
0
e−ρτ ln[pY B(τ)]dτ+
∫ ∞
t
e−ρτ ln[pY A(τ)]dτ
]
+
α
ρ
lnα+
1− α
ρ
ln(1− α). (A.3)
From Fukao and Benabou (1993), it is found that
lim
t→T
C(t) = 0. (A.4)
Therefore, by using (A.2), (A.3), and (A.4), we have
U(0;T ) = V (0;T )
U(0;T ) =
1
ρ
ln ρ+
1
ρ
ln[aH(0) +WH(0)]− α
[ ∫ T
0
e−ρτ ln[pY B(τ)]dτ +
∫ ∞
T
e−ρτ ln[pY A(τ)]dτ
]
+(1− α)
∫ ∞
0
e−ρτ ln pA(τ)dτ +
α
ρ
lnα +
1− α
ρ
ln(1− α). (A.5)
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Since, in equilibrium, all migrants are indifferent to their migration time, it
is shown that U(0; t) = V (0; t) for all t ∈ (0, T ). Thus, rearranging (A.2)
and substituting (A.5) and U(0; t) = V (0; t) into (A.2), we find that
λ˙(t) =
Ψeρt
ρ
[V (0; t)− V (0;T )]
=
Ψeρt
ρ
ln
[
aH(0) +WH(0; t)
aH(0) +WH(0;T )
]
− αΨeρt
∫ T
t
e−ρτ ln
pY A(τ)
pY B(τ)
dτ,
(A.6)
for any t ∈ (0, T ).
Appendix 2
We investigate the relationship between the expenditure ratio, EA/EB, and
the distribution of skilled workers, λ. Recall that the aggregate expenditure
in the economy is constant. Thus, it is sufficient to investigate the relation-
ship between EA(λ) and λ. To investigate this relationship, it is necessary
to specify a˜(λ).
First, we derive the aggregate expenditure in region A;
EA =
L
2
+ a˜(λ)
[
ρ+
kA
b
]
(A.7)
Now, using (32) for finding a˜(λ), we can identify it as follows:
a˜(λ) =
αβL
(σ − αβ)(ρ+ g(λ)) . (A.8)
Next, we show the derivative of g(λ) and a˜(λ) in terms of λ:
g′(λ) =
1
b
[kA(λ) + λk
′
A(λ)− kB(λ) + (1− λ)k′B(λ)],
and
da˜(λ)
dλ
= − αβLg
′(λ)
(σ − αβ)(ρ+ g(λ))2 .
From (A.7) and these equations, it is verified that dEA(λ)/dλ > 0, λ ∈ (0, 1).
Therefore, it is shown that 24
d(EA/EB)
dλ
> 0, λ ∈ (0, 1).
24Since EA + EB = E is constant, it is sufficient to verify dEA/dλ > 0.
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Appendix 3
As shown before, the economy follows a steady-state growth path under
different values of λ. When the economy is in pattern 1, the values of λ at
the steady state are 0, 1/2, and 1. On the contrary, when the economy is
in pattern 2, the values of λ at the steady state are 0, λˆ, and 1. Here, the
analysis of stability is shown.
Now, we show that, when trade is in pattern 1, the steady-state growth
path under λ˜ = 1/2 is unstable, while the steady-state growth path under
λ˜ = 1 is stable. Consider the case λ˜ = 1/2. Since two regions are in
symmetry, we focus on a value of λ0 that is lower than 1/2. In this case, the
equilibrium migration dynamics of the skilled worker is represented by (55).
Now, using the asset value of intermediate goods firms and the growth
rate, we find that
N(t)
N(τ)
= e−
R τ
t g[λ(v)]dv.
Using this equation, at each t ≥ 0, the following relationship reveals
a(t) = N(t)Π(t) =
αβE
σ
∫ ∞
t
e−
R τ
t [ρ+g[λ(v)]]dvdτ. (A.9)
In addition, from dynamics,
a(T ) =
αβE
σ
1
ρ+ g(λ˜)
. (A.10)
Hence, it is found that a(t) is not dependent on N(0) = N0. This implies
that N0 does not affect the equilibrium values of variables except N(t).
Then, the wage of skilled workers in region s at time t is as follows:
ws(t) = a(t)
ks(t)
b
. (A.11)
By definition, we write as follows, for t ≥ T ,
W (0; t) =
∫ t
0
e−ρτwB(τ)dτ +
∫ T
t
e−ρτwA(τ)dτ
= W (0;T )−
∫ T
t
e−ρτwB(τ)dτ +
∫ T
t
e−ρτwA(τ)dτ
= W (0;T ) +
∫ T
t
e−ρτa(τ)
kA(τ)− kB(τ)
b
dτ, (A.12)
where
W (0;T ) =
∫ T
0
e−ρτa(τ)
kA[λ(τ)]
b
dτ +
a(T )kA(λˆ)e
−ρT
b
.
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If the workers who locate in region s do not migrate, then, it is shown that
Ws(0) =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρτa(τ)
ks[λ(τ)]
b
dτ. (A.13)
Now, we write the expenditure of region A as follows:
EA(t) =
L
2
+ λ(0)ρ[a(0) +WA(0)] +
∫ t
0
λ˙(τ)ρ[a(0) +W (0; τ)]dτ.
The last term in this equation represents the expenditure of workers that
move from region B to region A between 0 and t. Since E(t) = EA(t)+EB(t),
EB(t) = E − EA(t). Therefore, the following equations hold:
EB(T ) =
L
2
+ (1− λ˜)ρ[a(0) +WB(0)].
and
E˙B(t) = −E˙A(t) = −λ˙(t)ρ[a(0) +W (0; t)].
In addition, we write the expenditure of region B for each t ≥ T ,
EB(t) = EB(T )−
∫ T
t
E˙B(τ)dτ
=
L
2
+ (1− λ˜)ρ[a(0) +WB(0)] +
∫ T
t
λ˙(τ)ρ[a(0) +W (0; τ)]dτ.
From the discussion above, we show that
EA(t)− EB(t) = λ(0)ρ[a(0) +WA(0)] +
∫ t
0
λ˙(τ)ρ[a(0) +W (0; τ)]dτ
− (1− λ˜)ρ[a(0) +WB(0)]−
∫ T
t
λ˙(τ)ρ[a(0) +W (0; τ)]dτ. (A.14)
Proposition A.1 The steady-state growth path under λ˜ is stable.
Proof. Under dynamics and λ˜ = 1/2,
λ(t) <
1
2
, for t < T,
λ(t) =
1
2
, for t ≥ T. (A.15)
Since 1/2 ≤ λ ≤ 1, it is clear that
kA[λ(t)] ≡ [λ(t) + η(1− λ(t))]1/ψ ≤ [1− λ(t) + ηλ(t)]1/ψ ≡ kB[λ(t)]. (A.16)
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Since kA is an increasing function of λ, η ≤ 1, and a(t) > 0 for t ≥ 0, it is
found from (A.12) that
W (0; t) ≤ W (0;T ).
This implies that
aH +W (0; t)
aH +W (0;T )
=
a(0) +W (0; t)
a(0) +W (0;T )
≤ 1. (A.17)
From (A.12) and (A.16), it is obvious that WA(0) ≤ WB(0). Hence, (A.14)
is rewritten as follows:
EA(t)− EB(t) < λ(0)ρ[a(0) +WA(0)]− (1− 1
2
)ρ[a(0) +WB(0)]
+
∫ T
0
λ˙(τ)ρ[a(0) +W (0; τ)]dτ
< (λ0 − 1
2
)ρ[a(0) +WB(0)] +
∫ T
0
λ˙(τ)ρ[a(0) +W (0; τ)]dτ.
(A.18)
In addition, from the definition, it is shown that, for t < T ,
WB(0)−W (0; τ) =
∫ ∞
τ
e−ρs[wB(v)− wA(v)]dv
=
∫ ∞
τ
e−ρva(v)
kB(λ(v))− kA(λ(v))
b
dv ≥ 0.(A.19)
Given λ(T ) = 1/2, we rewrite (A.18) as follows:
EA(t)− EB(t) < (λ0 − 1
2
)ρ[a(0) +WB(0)] +
(∫ T
0
λ˙(τ)dτ
)
ρ[a(0) +WB(0)]
= (λ0 − 1
2
)ρ[a(0) +WB(0)] + (
1
2
− λ0)ρ[a(0) +WB(0)] = 0.
Therefore, we state that
EA(t) < EB(t) for t ≤ T (A.20)
From the discussion in 4.1, (13) and (23), we obtain that
pY A(t)
pY B(t)
= min
{(
EA(t)
EB(t)
) β
1−σ
, τβI
}
.
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Thus, we rewrite (A.6) as follows:
λ˙(t) =
Ψeρt
ρ
ln
[
a(0) +W (0; t)
a(0) +W (0; τ)
]
+
αβΨeρt
σ − 1
∫ T
t
e−ρv ln
[
min
{(
EA
EB
)
, τ 1−σI
}]
dv.
(A.21)
Therefore, it is found that RHS in (A.21) is negative from (A.20). Hence,
this implies that, under λ˜ = 1/2, there is no equilibrium to satisfy the mc
hypothesis, that is, the steady-state growth path under λ˜ = 1/2 is unstable.
Q.E.D.
Then, consider the case λ˜ = 1. Suppose that the equilibrium path that
satisfies the dynamics under λ˜ = 1 given λ0 ∈ [1/2, 1). Under the mc hy-
pothesis and λ˜ = 1, for λ0 ≥ 1/2, we write
1
2
< λ(t) < 1, for t ∈ (0, T ),
λ(T ) = 1. (A.22)
Note that, since 1/2 < λ ≤ 1, kA[λ(t)] ≥ kB[λ(t)]. This implies that
WA(0) ≡ W (0; 0) ≥ W (0; t) ≥ W (0;T ), t ≥ T.
From this relationship, we show that
aH +W (0; t)
aH +W (0;T )
=
a(0) +W (0; t)
a(0) +W (0;T )
≥ 1, t ≥ T. (A.23)
From (A.12) and λ˜ = 1, it is shown that, for t ∈ (0, T ),
EA(t)− EB(t) = λ0ρ[a(0) +WA(0)] +
∫ t
0
λ˙(τρ[a(0) +W (0; τ)]dτ
−
∫ T
t
λ˙(τ)ρ[a(0) +W (0; τ)]dτ
> λ0ρ[a(0) +WA(0)]−
∫ T
0
λ˙(τ)ρ[a(0) +WA(0)]dτ
≥ λ0ρ[a(0) +WA(0)]−
(∫ T
0
λ˙(τ)dτ
)
ρ[a(0) +WA(0)].
Since
∫ T
0
λ˙(τ)dτ = 1− λ0, this equation is rewritten as follows:
EA(t)− EB(t) = (2λ0 − 1)ρ[a(0) +WA(0)] ≥ 0.
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This implies that, when λ0 ≥ 1/2,
EA(t) ≥ EB(t) (A.24)
In the same approach, since EA(t)/EB(t) ≥ 1, the difference in the price of
final good produced in each region is as follows:
pY A
pY B
= min
{(
EA(t)
EB(t)
) β
1−σ
,
(
1
τI
)β}
≤ 1 for t ∈ (0, T ] (A.25)
Here, we define as follows: for t ∈ [0, T ]
∆V (t) ≡ eρt[V (0; t)− V (0;T )]
=
eρt
ρ
ln
[
a(0) +W (0; t)
a(0) +W (0;T )
]
+
αβΨeρt
σ − 1
∫ T
t
e−ρτ ln
[
min
{
EA(t)
EB(t)
,
(
1
τI
)β}]
dτ.
(A.26)
Using this definition, we find that, given each λ0 ∈ (1/2, 1),
∆V (t) > 0 for t ∈ [0, T )
∆V (T ) = 0 (A.27)
Hence, from (A.6) and (A.30), it is shown that
λ˙(t) = Ψ∆V (t) > 0 (A.28)
By assumption λ0 ∈ (1/2, 1], and even though λ˙(t) is positive when t is close
to 0:
λ˙(0) ≡ lim
t→0
λ˙(t) > 0. (A.29)
Therefore, when λ0 = 1/2, λ˙ > 0. This implies that expectation plays an
important role in the economy.
Next, we show that, starting from λ0 ∈ (1/2, 1], the economy reaches the
point λ = 1 for a finite time.
From (A.9) and (A.10), we have the following representation:
αβE
σ
1
ρ+ 1
≤ a(t) ≤ αβE
σ
1
ρ+ g(1
2
)
(A.30)
and
a(T ) =
µE
σ
1
ρ+ 1
. (A.31)
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In addition, by using (A.13), we rewrite the following form:
WA(0) =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρτa(τ)
kA[λ(τ)]
b
dτ ≥ αβE
σ
1
ρ+ 1
∫ ∞
0
e−ρτ
kA[λ(τ)]
b
dτ
≥ αβE
σ
1
ρ+ 1
1
2
(1 + η)
ρb
. (A.32)
As shown before, EA(t) ≥ EB(t), which implies that EB(t) ≤ E/2 for t ≤ T .
Using (7), the ratio between the expenditure of region A and that of region
B is
EA(t)
EB(t)
> 1 +
2(λ0 − 1)ρ[a(0) +WA(0)]
EB(t)
≥ 1 + 2(2λ0 − 1)αβE
σ
ρ+
1
2
(1+η)
b
ρ+ 1
.
(A.33)
By the definition of ∆V , (A.30) is represented by the following equation:
∆V =
eρt
ρ
ln
[
a(0) +W (0; t)
a(0) +W (0;T )
]
+
αβΨeρt
σ − 1
∫ T
t
e−ρτ ln
[
min
{
1 + 2(2λ0 − 1)αβE
σ
ρ+
1
2
(1+η)
b
ρ+ 1
,
1
τ 1−σI
}]
dτ
>
αβΨeρt
σ − 1
∫ T
t
e−ρτ ln
[
min
{
1 + 2(2λ0 − 1)αβE
σ
ρ+
1
2
(1+η)
b
ρ+ 1
,
1
τ 1−σI
}]
dτ
=
1− e−ρ(T−t)
ρ
J(λ(0)), (A.34)
where
J(λ0) =
αβΨ
σ − 1 ln
[
min
{
1 + 2(2λ0 − 1)αβE
σ
ρ+
1
2
(1+η)
b
ρ+ 1
,
1
τ 1−σI
}]
. (A.35)
It is clear that J(λ0) > 0 when λ(0) > 1/2. In addition, it is shown that
dJ(λ(0))/dλ0 ≥ 0. Rewriting (A.30) by using (A.38), it is shown that
λ˙(t) = Ψ∆V (t) >
ΨJ(λ0)
ρ
[1− e−ρ(T−t)]. (A.36)
Integrating both sides in (A.36) from t to T expose that
ρ2
Φ
1− λ0
J(λ0)
> ρT − (1− e−ρT ). (A.37)
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Here, we denote the solution of the following equation as Tsup(λ0):
ρ2
Φ
1− λ0
J(λ0)
= ρT − (1− e−ρT ). (A.38)
It is illustrated that, for each λ0 ∈ (1/2, 1), there is a single solution, Tsup(λ0),
which is positive, continuous, and decreasing on (1/2, 1), while
lim
λ0→1
Tsup(λ0) = 0. (A.39)
Therefore, it is said that the value of T associated with the equilibrium path
that starts from λ0 is less than Tsup(λ0). Thus, we conclude as follows.
Lemma A.1 Suppose λ˜ = 1, and assume that the mc hypothesis holds.
There is a function Tsup(λ0) defined on (1/2, 1). This is positive, contin-
uous, and decreasing. In addition, this function is such that the equilibrium
path that starts from λ0 ∈ (1/2, 1) at time 0 reaches λ˜ = 1 before Tsup(λ0),
where limλ0→1 Tsup(λ0) = 0.
Due to the fact that λ(1/2), the function Tsup(λ0) has the following prop-
erty.
lim
λ0→1/2
Tsup(λ0) =∞ (A.40)
However, the time that λ reaches λ˜ = 1 is finite. Since, when λ0 = 1/2,
∆V (t) > 0 and ∆V (t) is continuous on (0, T ), it is shown that λ˙(t) > 0, which
implies that λ(t) > 1/2 along the equilibrium path starting from λ0 = 1/2.
Now, we show the existence of a neighborhood, Λ, in such a way that
there is an equilibrium path that leads to λ˜ = 1 for any λ0 ∈ Λ. We define
this as follows:
²(t) ≡ ρ[a(0) +W (0; t)]. (A.41)
If (λ(t),∆V (t), a(t), ²(t), EA(t))
T
t=0 is the equilibrium path that reaches λ˜ = 1
at time T and starts from the initial distribution, λ0, at time 0, then the
dynamics is as follows: for t ∈ (0, T ),
λ˙ = Φ∆V,
∆˙V = ρ∆V − a(t)
²(t)
[kA(λ)− kB(λ)]− αβρΨ
σ − 1 ln
[
min
{(
EA
EB
)
,
(
1
τ 1−σI
)}]
.
a˙ = [ρ+ g(λ)]a− αβE
σ
,
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²˙ = −ρe−ρtakA(t)− kB(t)
b
,
E˙A = λ˙ρ[a(0) +W (0; t)] = Φ∆V ².
The terminal conditions are as follows:
λ(0) = λ0, λ(T ) = 1, (A.42)
V (T ) = 0,
a(T ) =
αβE
σ
1
ρ+ 1
,
EA(T ) = E − 1
2
,
²(T ) = ρ
[
a(0) +
∫ T
0
e−ρτa(τ)
kB(τ)
b
dτ +
αβE
σρ
e−ρT
ρ+ 1
]
. (A.43)
The set of terminal conditions is unusual in two points. First, λ is specified
at both end points. Second, ²(T ) is a complex condition involving integrals.
Hence, it is not straightforward to show the existence of an equilibrium path
that starts from each λ0 ∈ Λ, whose Λ is neighborhood of λ˜ = 1. Therefore,
we take a different way to reach the desired result. This is that given terminal
conditions are specified at time T , and we move backward from t = T to t = 0
by introducing new time variables:
τ ≡ T − t
In addition, instead of specifying λ0, we specify T and obtain the associated
λ0. Using the new variable, we rewrite the dynamics as follows: for τ ∈ (0, T )
λ˙ = −Φ∆V, (A.44)
∆˙V = −ρ∆V + a
²
[kA(λ)− kB(λ)] + αβρΨ
σ − 1 ln
[
min
{(
EA
EB
)
,
(
1
τ 1−σI
)}]
,
a˙ = −(ρ+ g(λ))a+ αβE
σ
,
²˙ = ρe−ρ(T−t)a
kA(λ)− kB(λ)
b
,
E˙A = −Φ∆V ²,
where
λ(0) = 1,
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∆V (0) = 0,
a(0) =
αβE
σ
1
ρ+ 1
,
EA(0) = E − L
2
,
²(0) = ρ
[
a(T ) +
∫ T
0
e−ρτa(τ)kB[λ(τ)]dτ +
αβE
σρ
e−ρT
ρ+ 1
]
. (A.45)
Since ²(T ) is complex, we denote it as ²(0) = ²0, where ² is a parameter that
can be chosen appropriately. It can be shown that, for each sufficiently small
T , there is a closed interval, I²(T ), in the positive part of a real number, such
that, for each ²0 ∈ I²(T ), the above system and ²0 have a unique solution,
denoted as
λ[(s;T, ²0),∆(s;T, ²0), a(s;T, ²0), EA(s;T, ²0)]
T
s=0.
Let us denote ²(0;T, ²0) as the value associated with RHS in ²(0). It is shown
that
²(0;T, ²0) ≡ ρ
[
a(T ;T, ²0)+
∫ T
0
e−ρτa(τ ;T, ²0)kB[λ(τ ;T, ²0)]dτ+
αβE
σρ
e−ρT
ρ+ 1
]
.
It is shown that the equation, ²(0;T, ²0) = ²0, has a unique solution, denoted
as ²0(T ). This derives the associated value of λ at τ = T , denoted as λ0(T ) ≡
λ(T ;T, ²0). Finally, by showing that λ0(T ) is a continuous function on the
interval (0, Tˆ ] and has the following property,
lim
T→0
λ0(T ) = 0,
we obtain the desired neighborhood of λ˜ = 1, [λ0(Tˆ ), 1). This is sufficient to
establish the stability of the steady-state growth path under λ˜ = 1. We may
conclude the following:
Proposition A.2 The steady-state growth path under λ˜ = 1 is stable.
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Figure 4: The case of τ 1−σI ≥ σ−αβσ+αβ when the trade of final good does not
occur
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Figure 5: The case of τ¯M < τˆM < τM or τˆM < τ¯M < τM when both trade
pattern occur.
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Figure 6: The case of τM < τ¯M < τˆM when both trade pattern occur.
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Figure 7: The case of τˆM < τM < τ¯M when both trade patterns occur.
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Figure 8: The case of τM < τˆM < τ¯M or τM < τ¯M < τˆM when both trade
patterns occur.
